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Abstract
An overview of literature on radicalization in the Muslim diaspora in
Europe finds identity crises to be a key precipitant to the process.
Studies also typically focus on the manipulation of identify by violent
Islamic extremist groups. This paper attempts to contribute to the
discussion on the role of identity in radicalization by using social identity
theory. In doing so, the article explores the formation and transformation
process of social identities, and argues that the nature of community-
level groups and networks may contribute to identity ‘readiness’ for
radicalization. To this end, special focus is given to formally recognized
Islamist non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and institutions and
their potential impact on Muslim religious identity in the European
Muslim diaspora. Findings suggest that the more pervasive the ideology
of Islamist representatives is, the more likely the normative environment
in the diaspora is to be conducive to both non-violent and violent Islamic
extremism.
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Introduction  
There is little doubt that the surge in scholarly interest in Violent Islamic Extremism (VIE) and 
Islamic Extremism (IE) is a partial result of the securitization of political Islam as potentially one 
of the largest threats facing Europe in the 21st century. Given that prior to 9/11 little attention 
had been paid to the phenomena of religiously inspired terrorism in the field of terrorism studies, 
scholars and practitioners have come a long way in shedding light on the particularities of the 
processes underlying it.1 Despite this, the studies on radicalization have been slow to unfold, 
bearing answers that have been useful in identifying checklist factors perceived to contribute to 
the process, but challenged by the lack of solid working theory.  
 
Much credit has been given to terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda in their efforts to radicalize 
and recruit, despite the fact that these organizations lie on the fringe of a much wider spectrum of 
non-violent political Islam. Such intentional myopia can arguably be attributed to the sensitive 
nature of this particular brand of terrorism, given that its adherents draw from the one of the 
world’s fastest growing religions. Accusations of “Islamophobia” in Europe have made 
European governments hesitant to confront sub-state actors that may indirectly support the global 
Jihadist movement. Although discrimination should not be discredited, the refusal of 
governments to accept that the phenomenon is more than tangentially tied to specific 
understandings of Islam has hindered states’ abilities to adequately address the problem.    
   
Scholarship has offered several explanations as to why individuals and groups have had the 
compulsion to act out what they believe to be a religious duty. To this end, the progression of 
Islamic theology and its breakdown into various competing understandings and sects has 
provided the groundwork for understanding the radicalization process from a religious 
perspective.2 This has been followed by profiling and intensive research in social movement 
theory and the socialization process of would-be Jihadis, the assumed predisposition of specific 
“identities,” a suggested clash between Western and Islamic values in general, and studies on 
integration which more or less constitute the cornerstone of most state-sponsored radicalization 
prevention efforts.3  
 
Studies on radicalization find identity to stand at the fore of the radicalization process. Success 
partially lies in the radical’s ability to provide the radical-to-be with a distinctive identity. Here, 
                                                 
1
 Only seven out of 102 articles between 2001 and 2002 were related to ‘Muslim extremism or an associated Middle 
East terrorist topic’; Magnus Ranstorp, "Mapping Terrorism Studies after 9/11," in Richard Jackson, Marie Smyth, 
and Jeroen Gunning (eds.), Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda (New York: Routledge, 2009), 22. 
2
 Calvert, John, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islam (London: Hurst, 2010); Shmuel Bar, "The Religious 
Sources of Islamic Terrorism," Policy Review 125 (June/July 2004): 27-37. 
3
 Post, Jerrold M., The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Sageman, Marc, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-first Century 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel, and Alan S. Waterman, 
"Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32:6 (2009): 541; Huntington, Samuel 
P. The Clash of Civilizations? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 
1993); Wiktorowicz, Quintan. Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2004); James Brandon and Lorenzo Vidino, "ICSR Report: Countering Radicalization in Europe," 
ICSR RSS (December 12, 2012), available at: http://icsr.info/2012/12/icsr-report-countering-radicalization-in-
europe/. 
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the identity is based on a puritanical interpretation of the religion that imbues the radical with a 
sense of moral and spiritual superiority, setting him/her aside from the rest of society.4 In this 
sense, the new radical successfully joins an imaginary elite social group, and the second task in 
the recruiting radical’s handbook is the slow and steady demonization of the society that exists 
outside the group.5 Geopolitics is presented through religious frames to further the notion of a 
conspiratorial attack of the West against Islam, and sets the stage for the adoption of violent 
means by some.  
 
Implicit in a majority of literature on radicalization in the field of terrorism studies is that Jihadist 
organizations/networks and their recruiters are the sole agents promoting radicalization. Other 
factors are only agitants that support the overall process. This paper argues that Jihadists are also 
recipients of individuals whose identities have already been radicalized.6 It addresses the 
following questions: How and why could Muslim identity in the European diaspora be becoming 
more prone to extremism?; and, What other, non-violent actors could be contributing to the 
radicalization process? In doing so, the paper does not argue that European Muslims are 
necessarily becoming more extreme, yet attempts to gauge the non-violent sources of 
radicalization that may be contributing to extremism. The term “diaspora” is used in the paper to 
denote a minority that shares a religious social identity (in this case Islam), and applies to all 
Muslims in Europe regardless of the generation to which they belong.  
 
The paper uses social identity theory to help in answering these questions and is structured as 
follows. After defining relevant terminology, the paper proceeds with an overview of literature 
on radicalization, with a focus on the role of identity. This is followed by an introduction to 
social identity theory principles and a summary of a taxonomy measuring expected behavioral, 
perceptual and effective outcomes on threats to groups. The latter is used to challenge some of 
the findings in terrorism studies literature that attribute radicalization in the European diaspora to 
threatened and/or stigmatized religious social identity issues. Drawing on both, the paper then 
attempts to expand on the various “schools of thought” on the role of identity in the 
radicalization process, as well as suggest how non-violent elements may contribute to this 
process.  
 
The purpose of the paper is thus two-fold. First, it attempts to broaden the discussion on identity 
through viewing it from a socio-psychological lens. This preliminary examination underscores a 
number of flawed assumptions in the current radicalization studies discourse that could provide 
avenues for future research. Then, building on theory, it begins to suggest connections between 
non-violent, legal European Islamist activists, movements and organizations, and the identity 
dynamics of radicalization; the argument being that the former play a crucial role in setting into 
motion the latter. It recognizes that the task of understanding radicalization is “[…] not a task for 
                                                 
4
 Sadek Hamid, "The Attraction of 'Authentic Islam': Salafism and British Muslim Youth," in Roel Meijer (ed.), 
Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 384-403.  
5
 Schwartz et al.,"Terrorism,” 541. 
6
 The paper thus argues from the perspective that radicalization is a ‘bottom up’ process. Support for this perspective 
has previously been argued by other scholars including Sageman, “Leaderless Jihad,” 2008; Peter R. Neumann, 
Brooke Rogers, Rogelio Alonso, and Luis Martinez, Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant 
Movement in Europe (London: ICSR, 2007). 
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a single theory or discipline,” and is one that should be “[…] able to integrate mechanisms at the 
micro (individual) and macro (societal/cultural) levels.”7  
 
Two important caveats should be made before proceeding. First, the argument made in this paper 
is not all encompassing as it does not and cannot account for all the pathways into and processes 
of radicalization. It realizes that: “Different pathways and mechanisms operate in different ways 
for different people at different points in time and perhaps in different contexts.”8  
 
Second, many external influences play a role in the radicalization process as per findings in 
literature. The author acknowledges this, yet focuses primarily on the influence of non-violent 
European Islamism on Muslim religious identity dynamics in the diaspora, and the consequent 
implications this holds for the study of radicalization and VIE.   
 
Terminology 
As in the case of defining “terrorism,” most studies on Islamic extremism (IE) settle for a 
working definition due to lack of consensus on a fixed definition. The term “fundamentalism” is 
oftentimes used interchangeably with the term “extremism,” perhaps due to its historical 
religious connotations that automatically link it to forms of movements based on religious 
pretexts. This paper similarly draws from definitions of fundamentalism to define and explain IE, 
violent Islamic extremism (VIE), and the radicalization process. Although not used 
interchangeably, the paper adopts the position of R. Korteweg that understands IE as a variant of 
Islamic fundamentalism (IF).9   
 
IF is not a unique religious phenomena and shares many features of the earlier American 
Protestant movement that coined the term, like the rejection of modernity and secularism, and the 
castigation of fellow coreligionists as being “corrupters of the tradition” and “pawns of 
unbelievers.”10 IF is similarly understood as the rejection of democratic and secular forms of 
governance as adopted by the West. This rejection by the ideological forefathers of the 
movement is based on the notion of “the unity of God” (tawhid), which argues against the 
sovereignty of states and for the sole sovereignty of God’s laws (hakimiyyah) as the only 
legitimate form of governance; in this case the Islamic Shari’a. However, whereas Christian 
fundamentalism has remained a mostly non-violent fringe movement, active in only a handful of 
countries and lacking the transnational nature of its Islamic counterpart, IF has witnessed a 
marked surge since the 1970s and has spawned various global, violent offshoots, of which al-
Qaeda and its so-called “affiliated movements” are the most prominent.11  
                                                 
7
 Tinka M. Veldhuis, and Jørgen Staun. "Islamist Radicalisation: A Root Cause Model," Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations Clingendael (2009), available at: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/?id=7740. 
8
 Randy Borum, "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories," Journal of 
Strategic Security 4:4 (2011): 8, available at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss4/2/. 
9
 Rem Korteweg, Sajjan Gohel, Francois Heisbourg, Magnus Ranstorp, and Rob De Wijk, "Background 
Contributing Factors - Radicalization and Recrutiment," in Magnus Ranstorp (ed.), Understanding Violent 
Radicalisation: Terrorist and Jihadist Movements in Europe (London: Routledge, 2010), 26. 
10
 Michael Barkun, "Religious Violence and the Myth of Fundamentalism,” in Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur 
(eds.), Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 60. 
11
 Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Reference for more on Christian 
fundamentalism.  
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The ineffectiveness of Christian fundamentalism in attracting a larger following may be one of 
the consequences of the repositioning of the role of religion in secular states. The separation of 
church and state in most Western societies has effectively reduced religion to the private realm 
and distanced society from the influence, power and dominance that institutionalized religion 
once had over collectivities. Religion is no longer a tie that binds and, as Beit-Hallahmi states, is 
“…pluralist, individualistic, privatized, achieved, and often freely chosen.”12 Thus, if a defining 
characteristic of social movements is their role in socially constructing new meanings based on 
“frameworks of understanding that resonate with potential participants and broader publics,” 
attempting to draw support from a collectivity that no longer prioritizes religious frames for the 
creation of meaning may prove difficult.13  
 
The same argument is harder to apply to the Islamic context. Islam not only remains to be a 
defining, collectively expressed, cultural characteristic but also “contains a corpus of legal and 
moral regulations and thereby constitutes the idea of a social order.”14 Parallels in “frameworks 
of understanding” between targeted Muslim communities and Islamic fundamentalists provide a 
suppler basis for mobilization.15    
   
IF generally speaks to many of the definitions related to religious fundamentalism that include: 
the “…return to a holy text considered infallible and which cannot be interpreted critically…” 
“…the return to an idealized religious-political reality,” and (most importantly) “a belief 
system…[in which] its adherents regard its tenets as uncompromising and direct transcendental 
imperatives to political action oriented towards the rapid and comprehensive reconstruction of 
society.”16  The lattermost definition specifically refers to groups and individuals that actively 
advocate for the reconstruction of society and is defined as political IF (henceforth referred to as 
‘Islamism’ in this paper). This is because not all Islamic fundamentalists promote political 
activism to reconstruct society. Indeed, various strands within the Wahabbist-inspired school of 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
12
 Benjami Beit-Hallahmi, "The Return of Martyrdom: Honour, Death and Immortality," Totalitarian Movements 
and Politcal Religions 4:3 (2003): 12.  
13
 Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research," 
Mediterranean Politics 7:3 (September 26, 2007): 202.  
14
 Matenia Sirseloudi, "The Meaning of Religion and Identity for the Violent Radicalisation of the Turkish Diaspora 
in Germany," Terrorism and Political Violence 24:5 (November 15, 2012): 808. 
15
 Max Taylor, and John Horgan. "The Psychological and Behavioural Bases of Islamic Fundamentalism," 
Terrorism and Political Violence 13:4 (2001): 42; Reference to find four qualities of Islam that ‘sustain 
fundamentalist positions’: ‘[…] claims to universal validity’, ‘[…] theocratic demands extending to all aspects of 
life’, ‘[…] sanctification of Islamic law and its rulings’, and ‘[…] general equation of the state with the 
implementation of Islam.’ 
16
 Luisa Giuriato and Maria Cristina Molinari,"Rationally Violent Tactics: Evidence from Modern Islamic 
Fundamentalism," in Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe (eds.), Political 
Extremism and Rationality (Cambridge: University Press, 2002); Pisoiu, Daniela, Islamist Radicalisation in Europe: 
An Occupational Change Process (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 15; Menachem Friedman, "Jewish Zealots: 
Conservative versus Innovative," in Emmanuel Sivan and Menachem Friedman (eds.), Religious Radicalism and 
Politics in the Middle East (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990 ); Pisoiu, “Islamist 
Radicalization in Europe,” 15; Lustick, Ian, For the Land and the Lord: Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel (New 
York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), 5-6. 
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Salafism favor isolation as a means of religious purification and reject the intermingling of 
religion and politics.17  
 
Islamists not only wish to reconstruct societies where Muslims are the majority but, in following 
the example of the Prophet Mohammed and the successive Islamic Caliphs, to pursue a “Islamic” 
reconstruction of all world societies based on Shari’a. The spectrum of Islamism is large and 
spans many movements and “sub-ideologies” that together agitate for similar goals but reserve 
disagreements on the means and methods of implementing them.18  
 
A simple example would be to compare and contrast the methodology of Jihadist groups like al-
Qaeda, and the global Muslim Brotherhood. The former lies on the violent end of the spectrum 
of political Islam and openly propagates the violent overthrow of governments it deems un-
Islamic. Such a group holds loose conceptions of Islamic infidelity or apostasy that are generally 
non-negotiable, and is an extreme manifestation of IF.19 The latter has, given a few exceptions, 
focused on a “bottom up” approach to the Islamizing of society through a socialization process 
that indoctrinates Muslim communities and populations into adopting values, beliefs, and norms 
that support its agenda.20 Give or take a few peculiarities, several similarities exist between the 
overall narrative and goals of both.21 This is one of the main reasons why a few European 
governments halted cooperation with Islamist organizations in counter-radicalization processes. 
Experience showed that many of the organizations involved, whilst condemning violence as a 
legitimate means, nevertheless upheld many of the narratives of their violent counterparts.22 
 
To summarize, institutionalized IF is understood as a wide spectrum that encompasses all forms 
of political Islam, and is equated in this paper to the term “Islamism.” Unlike Roy’s suggestion 
that fundamentalists and Islamists are differentiated along the lines of “political action, shari’a 
and the issue of women,” this paper argues that the primary distinction between fundamentalism 
at the individual and institutionalized level rests with political action.23 That is, Islamists work 
towards the (re)construction of an Islamic society through the use of some organized form of 
political action, as well as possessing all other attributes commonly associated with Islamic 
                                                 
17
 The Jamis and Madkhalis are a good example. For an in-depth discussion see Bernard Hakel, "On the Nature of 
Salafi Thought and Action," in Roel Meijer, Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (New York: Hurst 
& Company, 2009), 33-57.  
18
 Maajid Nawaz, "Combating Violent Extremism: The Counterradicalization Debate in 2011," Address, Policy 
Forum Luncheon at The Washington Institute, Washington D.C., available at: 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/combating-violent-extremism-the-counterradicalization-
debate-in-2011. 
19
 Quintan Wiktorowicz, "A Genealogy of Radical Islam," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28:2 (2005): 76. 
20
 Israel Altman, “Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement 1928-2007,” Current Trends in Islamist 
Ideology (February 24, 2009), available at: http://www.currenttrends.org/research/detail/strategies-of-the-muslim-
brotherhood-movement-1928-2007. 
21
 Dina Al Raffie, "Whose Hearts and Minds? Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Salafi Jihadism," Journal of 
Terrorism Research (August 2012), available at: http://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk/index.php/jtr/index. 
22
 This was especially the case in the UK. The case study on the UK counter-radicalization strategy in discusses this 
in more detail; Brandon et al., “ICSR Report: Countering Radicalization in Europe.”   
23
 Roy, Olivier, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Pisoiu, “Islamist 
Radicalisation in Europe,” 17. 
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fundamentalism. And thus, all Islamists are Islamic fundamentalists by nature yet not all 
fundamentalists are necessarily Islamists.  
 
How is extremism then derived as a variant of IF? Several parallels exist between definitions of 
extremism and those of fundamentalism. One of the most obvious is the existence of an 
uncompromising cognitive dissonance that markedly sets the extremist apart from mainstream 
systems of thought, belief or action. The extremist’s mindset revolves around an absolutist claim 
to an authentic truth, coupled with the steady rejection of opposing opinions and beliefs. As with 
IF, there is a need to reorder elements in the extremist’s surroundings to bring it into harmony 
with his/her views and visions. However, definitions of extremism not only stress a departure of 
views, norms and beliefs relative to the mainstream, but in some cases also imply the adoption of 
extraordinary actions to impose the world view of the individual/organization.24  
 
Parallels similarly exist between definitions of Islamism and extremism. The following definition 
of extremism by Neumann highlights this: “Extremism can be used to refer to political ideologies 
that oppose a society’s core values and principles […] opposes the core principles of democracy 
and universal human rights. The term can also be used to describe the methods through which 
political actors attempt to realize their aims, that is, by using means that ‘show disregard for the 
life, liberty, and human rights of others.’”25 In this context, Islamist ideology is necessarily 
extremist, and if violence is advocated or employed, violently extremist.  
 
Finally, for the purpose of this paper, radicalization is understood as a process. The definition of 
which is first based on two observations made by Pisoiu: 1) That ‘radicalizing at the individual 
level might be a strategic activity or set of activities, with a more or less clear set of objectives 
and undertaken by a rational actor;’ and 2) “…[Radicalization] has the features of gradualism, a 
succession of two or more different phases…”26 In this context, radicalization is understood as 
both gradual and intentional.   
 
A broader definition of political radicalization as forwarded by McCauley further understands 
“political radicalization” as having both functional and descriptive elements. From a functional 
perspective, the process is seen as the “increased preparation for and commitment to intergroup 
conflict.” From a descriptive perspective, the process is defined as a “change in beliefs, feelings, 
and behaviors in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in 
defense of the ingroup.”27 Radicalization in this paper is thus defined as the gradual and 
intentional process that consists of a set of activities that aim at changing the beliefs, feelings and 
behaviors of individuals with the intent of 1) Aligning them against the core values of societies 
in which individuals are based; and 2) Readying them for intergroup conflict, whereby society 
constitutes an out-group that must be fought.      
 
 
                                                 
24
 See discussion on extremism in Pisoiu, “Islamist Radicalisation in Europe,” 17-18. 
25
 Peter Neumann, "Prisons and Terrorism Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries," ICSR 2012, 
available at: http://icsr.info/projects/de-radicalisation-and-disengagement-in-prisons-lessons-from-15-countries/. 
26
 Pisoiu, “Islamist Radicalisation in Europe,” 24. 
27
 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism," 
Terrorism and Political Violence 20:3 (2008): 416. 
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The Radicalization Process: An Overview of Literature 
Two out of Dalgaard-Nielsen’s three “schools of thought” in her overview of radicalization 
studies in terrorism literature are used to structure this section: the “French Sociology” and 
“Social Movement Theory and Network Theory” schools.28 For each, a special focus is given to 
identity. The different schools are not intended to be mutually exclusive but intersect on varying 
levels.  
  
Radicalization and Identity 
The first school of thought, “French sociology,” centers primarily on identity formation and the 
effect of modernity and globalization on identity formation/reformation and the radicalization 
process. “Modernity” here implies secularism and the values and norms inherent to secular 
states. Thus, when studies talk about the inability of Muslims to handle modernity, they mainly 
refer to a potential clash between worldviews predicated on differing value systems. 
Globalization, through the spread of global media, social networking tools and technology, 
ensures an almost uninterrupted flow of information that raises cultural and religious awareness 
of a diaspora by connecting them to events back home.  
 
The first view in this school suggests that radicalization partially results from the inability of 
Muslims to handle modernity and globalization, particularly within the religious realm, in 
Western environments. Given the strict separation of church and state in Western democracies, 
Muslims are conscious of the fact that public displays of religiosity go against mainstream views 
that perceive religion to be a primarily private affair.29 The subsequent feeling of exclusion from 
mainstream society, that is at times strengthened by actual discrimination, leads certain 
individuals to fall back even further on religion as a means of reaffirming what they perceive to 
be a ‘threatened self-identity.’30 
 
The second view builds on the first and suggests that second and third generation Muslims face 
difficulties in balancing their religious and national identities.31 On the one hand, unlike their 
first generation predecessors who follow a traditional folk Islam, second and third generation 
immigrants are found to have a more “intellectual approach towards Islam.”32 This approach is 
premised on an individual preference to adopt certain cultural and religious elements, and is 
undoubtedly the influence of secular attitudes towards religious identity and expression as 
experienced in Western societies.  
 
On the one hand, the individualization of religious identity creation is stressful as Muslim youth 
are nevertheless subjected to their parents’ views at home, which brings into conflict their own, 
                                                 
28
 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, "Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know," Studies 
in Conflict & Terrorism 33:9 (2010): 797-814.  
29
 Roy, Olivier, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (London: Hurst &, 2004); Alex Wilner and Claire-
Jehanne Dubouloz, “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: An Interdisciplinary Approach To 
Understanding Radicalization,” Global Change, Peace and Security 22:1 (2010), 41.  
30
 Catarina Kinnvall, "Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological 
Security" Political Psychology 25:5 (2004): 742. 
31
 Mirella L. Stroink, “Processes and Preconditions Underlying Terrorism in Second-Generation Immigrants,” Peace 
and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 13:3 (2007): 293-312. 
32
 Sirseloudi, “The Meaning of Religion and Identity,” 813-14. 
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“secularized” religious identities and those of their families; all the while stressing a disconnect 
between the two and further alienating individuals from their families. On the other, society 
exerts its own pressures on the identity formation process. Here, a combination of 
socioeconomic, structural factors such as unemployment, and a low social standing relative to 
the societal average, may ferment feelings of disaffection towards the host country, making it 
difficult for the individual to fully identify as a national.  The result is a ‘double sense of non-
belonging’ that triggers a search for identity.33  
 
There are two recurrent themes on the topic of identity search.  The first understands the search 
for identity as a response to a personal crisis, of which a double sense of non-belonging could be 
one.34 The second is a result of feelings of guilt, compassion or empathy triggered by media 
portrayals of the suffering of co-religionists and/or fellow country-of-descent compatriots (i.e. 
the effects of globalization). Various actors often further portray this suffering as the intended 
outcome of foreign policies of the immigrant’s host countries as a means to suppress Muslims 
and defeat Islam. A search for meaning ensues whereby the individual attempts to reconcile 
national and religious identity attributes in answering the question, “Who am I?” in an individual 
test of loyalty. This view is often used to suggest why seemingly well-integrated, non-religious 
individuals may become radicalized.  
 
It is in this time of doubt, when the individual is searching for deeper meaning and a distinctive 
identity that a window of opportunity opens up for extremists. Utilizing complex framing 
processes that draw on geopolitics and religion, extremists cease on this confusion and offer up 
their ideologies as alternative value systems on which individuals can build a more definitive 
identity. This identity is eventually incorporated into a larger, imagined community of resistance, 
whose main antagonist is Western countries depicted as waging a war against Islam.  
 
Radicalization and Socialization  
There is a significant grey area that exists between drivers for radicalization at the individual 
level, and those at the organizational level, where the individual has already joined a violent 
extremist organization. The second category in Dielgaard-Nielsen, “Social Movement Theory 
and Network Theory,” summarizes scholarly attempts in bridging this gap by suggesting 
transactions at the group and community level that foster an environment conducive to adopting 
violent extremist ideas and behaviors.35  
 
Of particular importance are the works of Sageman, Wiktorowicz’s, Neumann and Rogers, and 
McCauley on the social processes that drive radicalization. Sageman uses network theory to 
demonstrate the importance of kinship, personal relations, and social circles in reinforcing 
extremist ideology.36 The latter draw more on social movement theories and group dynamics to 
                                                 
33
 Khosrokhavar, Farhad, Suicide Bombers: Allah's New Martyrs (London: Pluto Press, 2005), 185; Dalgaard-
Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe,” 800. 
34
 Wiktorowicz, Quintan, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
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examine how individuals and communities are mobilized by altering meaning construction 
through the application of select framing techniques.  
 
These constructivist approaches to understanding radicalization are useful as they help build on 
our understanding of how identities can be manipulated to mobilize individuals in serving the 
purpose of ideologies. If the “French Sociology” school sets identity as one of the core driving 
factors of radicalization, this school follows on by suggesting the next step in the process. 
Namely, it looks at how both extremist and non-extremist elements work to reformulate identities 
of Muslim youth through the creation of social circles that help cement select identities.   
 
In his study of al-Muhajiroun, Wiktorowicz finds that an individual particularly vulnerable to 
radicalization efforts is one that has recently experienced a crisis of sorts and is open to 
considering varying ideologies.37 Similarly, Sageman finds that a sense of “moral outrage” is 
derived from radicals witnessing global events against co-religionists.38 Ironically critical 
thinking, a value heavily praised in Western societies, becomes a useful tool for extremists when 
it provides the sort of existential, confused cognitive opening on which ideologues can play.  
 
The success of radicals in capitalizing on this opening depends not only on the presence (or lack 
thereof) of competing influences, but also on how high the individual already “ranks” on the 
supposed contributing factors of radicalization. Thus, if the individual is experiencing high 
anxiety with matters pertaining to religious identity, is disenfranchised due to a perception of 
unfair treatment, discrimination and the like, the likelihood of being open to accounts offering 
explanations for or else confirming these views is higher.39 This presupposes some level of 
radicalization “readiness,” and the success of the extremist narrative in mobilization relies on its 
resonance with already “espoused beliefs, ideas and values” of the target group.40  
 
Upon engaging with extremist elements, individuals are then subjected to a lengthy process 
whereby ideologues set about reconstructing realities by introducing alternative frames through 
which the individual is made to interpret their grievances. These frames are variations of existing 
religious, cultural ones that rework schemata of interpretation to affect the meaning attached to 
events. For example, the ills and disenfranchisement of the individual are attributed to a larger, 
conspiratorial campaign launched against Islam and Muslims. The reason the West has 
apparently been able to proceed undeterred with this campaign is due to the demise of Islam and 
the infiltration of Western values, which have corrupted Muslim morals and weakened the unity 
of the Islamic Ummah. The subsequent reinforcement of a Manichean  “us versus them” 
mentality fostered by increased socialization with like-minded individuals finally brings the 
individual fully into the extremists’ fold. 
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Geopolitics is a useful tool that Islamists and their violent Jihadi extensions utilize in tailoring 
the rhetoric of their ideologies. Argumentation varies depending on the extremity of the 
organization or group, yet the basic master narrative is that the “war on terror” is a guise under 
which the West is actually fighting a war against Islam. The details of the political narratives 
have been studied in detail elsewhere, but their significance in the radicalization process context 
lies in their implications.41 These political narratives work to both create and perpetuate a 
perception of intentional religious discrimination against Muslims in the European diaspora. 
When combined with identity confusion, or else the battle for reconciliation of European national 
and Islamic identities, it becomes clear that their purpose is to shift that balance in favor of the 
latter.  
 
Social Identity Theory 
This paper borrows elements from social identity theory (SIT) and Turner’s theory of self-
categorization (SC) to analyze and forward a more in-depth explanation of identity formation 
and transformation in the radicalization process.42 These two theories are used because they 
examine the socio-cognitive impact of groups and social categories on the development of 
personal identities and hence bridge the gap between the individual and the environment. 
Radicalization does not occur in a vacuum and so SIT, like social movement theory (SMT), is 
more useful as a lens through which to view the process.  
 
SIT is primarily interested in the socio-cognitive processes underlying group dynamics and how 
they shape identity. In this respect, it shares a lot with the framing theories in SMT, as SMT also 
focuses on the way that groups of people construct reality - and individual self-conceptions - 
through particular cognitive frameworks. Social identities are reflections of the social categories, 
groups, and networks into which individuals belong. Social categories are broad, “large-scale” 
sources of social identity that often provide the pretext for the formation of community level 
social networks and groups.43 Examples of large-scale categories are religion, gender, and 
ethnicity.  
 
Social categories define imaginary boundaries, which separate members (in-group) from non-
members (out-group). In other words, they are inherently discriminatory—though not necessarily 
negatively so—as they constitute norms and values that describe membership criteria and 
consequently set themselves apart from other social categories.44 Membership criteria not only 
demarcate the group, but also define the systems of meaning and frameworks through which 
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members make sense of their surrounding social environments. They are “thought communities,” 
where both behavior and perception are restrained by “normative constraints such as rules that 
specify what ways of thinking are appropriate in a particular social community or situation.”45  
 
Because the core function of the group to its members is found by SIT theorists to be its utility in 
boosting self-esteem and ego, internalized stereotypes and norms are developed in such a way 
that they favor the in-group.46 This is known as “self-enhancement” and is also an outcome of 
efforts to elevate the perceived status of the in-group relative to that of the out-group/out-
groups.47 The process of distinguishing the group through stereotype assignment and the 
allocation of cognitive frameworks is known as the “categorization” process.  
 
Turner elaborated on the categorization process in groups through his development of “self-
categorization” theory.48 Self-categorization is the cognitive process whereby individuals 
strengthen their social identity by emphasizing intra-group similarities and intergroup 
differences. Such distinctions sharpen group boundaries as well as the meaning systems inherent 
to the group, and set down group standards for behavior. Group standards ultimately become the 
blueprint for the individual’s identity and subsequent behavior; the individual is 
“depersonalized.”49 Self-categorization theory suggests that the adoption of a collective identity 
by a group member will trump his/her personal, individual identity, as he/she becomes an 
extension of the collective whole. 
 
Individuals typically belong to several social categories. These social categories will often drive 
the formation of community level groups and networks as individuals are subconsciously and/or 
consciously attracted to similar “others”—particularly if they are part of the minority or else 
belong to a lower status group in society.50 An important element of social identities is that they 
do not necessarily hinge on the continued interaction of group members in closed settings. 
Individuals act on behalf of the group according to the norms he/she internalize as a result of 
belonging to that group.51 Findings on what causes one social identity to dominate or else exert 
considerable influence on behavior are not well developed. Oakes suggests that salience is not in 
response to social stimuli as much as it is the “psychological significance of group 
membership.”52 An important definition of commitment as found in identity theory—a 
neighboring theory that shares similarities with SIT—finds identity salience to be high 
depending on the density and significance of the social network in which individuals are 
embedded.53 The suitability of the social identity, in terms of how appropriate its cognitive 
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frameworks are in fulfilling the goals and tasks that a situation presents, is another factor 
predicting salience.54 Other determinants of social identity salience may include:  
 
Intergroup Status Relations 
The status of a group is mostly a perceptual construct, but is also built on cues and stimuli from 
the surrounding social context that positions a group on a hierarchy of social identities.55 
Because groups are defined in contradistinction to out-groups, status is measured as a function of 
perceived relations between the group and the out-groups to which it compares itself. Groups 
may perceive themselves to possess a lower status relative to others or vice versa.  
 
Behavior based on perceived status relies on “stability and legitimacy” of these groups as well as 
the evaluative consequences of group membership.56 Intergroup conflict will arise if group 
members are dissatisfied with their lower status (i.e. perceive it to be illegitimate), are unable to 
adopt different social identities or “pass into them,” and believe that this can only be changed by 
changing social order. On the other hand, individuals belonging to lower status groups that are 
perceived by their members to be legitimate and more stable are less likely to compete or conflict 
with higher status groups. These individuals will nevertheless seek membership into higher 
status groups if the option to do so is perceived to be available.57 
  
Positive Evaluative Self-Conception 
Social identities are evoked insofar as they provide useful references with which the individual 
can make meaning of his/her surroundings. More importantly, social identities set the stage for 
self-evaluation by furnishing standards against which self-image and self-conceptions are 
measured.58 Essentially, group members must be able to make sense of the world around them 
within the cognitive framework of the social identity, and emerge from the process feeling 
positive and satisfied.59 If a particular identity is unable to provide the level of meaning and 
accompanying positive evaluative consequences, individuals can alternatively call on other 
social identities or categories they belong to, or else seek membership in other groups.60   
 
Level of Network Support for Social Identities 
The addition of the interpersonal context by Deaux is important as it discusses the influence of 
intra-group dynamics on social identities.61 People may typically prefer to join groups whose 
members share the same social categories. However, reality is more complex and networks in 
which individuals interact may not always provide the preferred basis for categorization as 
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dictated by chosen social identity claims or categories. Belonging to certain group categories is 
often subject to judgment by members of the individual’s wider network, and it is the feedback 
from the network (positive or negative) that will make a given social identity more or less 
salient.62 Because one of the core functions of networks is to provide support for chosen identity 
claims, the failure to do so may lead to either abandoning the network or the social group 
category.63 Alternatively, some theorists argue that networks provide “sites in which group 
identities may be subject to negotiation.”64 This implies individuals may also respond to 
contextual, network pressures through the “expansion and modification of identity definitions 
over time.”65  
 
Despite the existence of social categories into which people are born, these social constructs are 
not the primary determinants of identity and behavior. If anything, the literature seems to imply 
that human ego and self-esteem are two of the strongest drivers of identity in society, and that 
social categories are vehicles for recognizing and bolstering the latter. Further, because peoples’ 
identities are multilayered (i.e. they possess several), behavior can be more accurately predicted 
based on the salience of a given identity as opposed to its mere existence. Levels of commitment 
to given social identities as well as their usefulness in furnishing individuals with a positive 
sense of self are more important in determining which social identity is dominant, and thus 
which is more likely to drive behavior.  
 
Finally, perception is a key term in both theories, and is shaped by systems of meaning that 
constitute the groups, networks and broader social categories in which individuals belong. The 
content of these systems is important in assessing to what extent they allow for the adoption 
and/or tolerance of other systems of meaning. All social identities are defined by their 
differences relative to others. This discriminatory element, however, is not ipso facto negative 
but is more a yardstick for measuring distinction. Distinction includes all the internal cognitive 
processes and evaluative mechanisms that nurture self-esteem and positive self-image of 
belonging to a group. It is primarily the nature of the stereotypes associated with the out-group 
that will determine the relationship between the two in terms of tolerance of other or 
demonization of other.   
 
Social Identities and Threat  
An underlying assumption in terrorism studies is that a perception of threat to Islam is one of the 
main triggers of identity crises in Muslim youth. Because this assertion is so central to the 
discussion on radicalization, this paper integrates basic findings from social psychology on the 
anticipated perceptual, affective, and behavioral outcomes of group-directed threat. A taxonomy 
developed by Ellemers studies the effects of differing levels of threat on self and group 
membership based on levels of commitment.66 Although six different cells make up the matrix, 
this paper only includes that which measures group-directed threats vs. commitment.  
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For the first combination—group-directed threat vs. low individual commitment—the main 
coping strategy of individuals on all levels appears to be distancing oneself from the group. 
Perceptually, individuals explain away negative feedback from the surrounding environment by 
attributing it to the group and group values and not themselves personally.67 Low levels of group 
commitment lead to a weak collective sense of self, and so the group member is not entirely 
“depersonalized” and likewise not part of a cohesive whole threatened by relevant out-groups. 
Individuals also distance themselves by emphasizing the heterogeneity of group members as a 
means of showing that the negative attributes attached to the group do not apply to them.68  
 
On the affective level, the authors find that when group commitment is low, individuals will 
develop and maintain negative self-esteem vis-à-vis the group so long as feedback remains 
negative.69 The combination of affective and perceptual outcomes similarly translates into 
physically distancing oneself from the group. In this case, the most obvious alternative is shifting 
to another group. As opposed to trying to improve the group standing in society, group members 
instead display behaviors that indicate their desire to “pass” into other groups.70 Circumstances 
that may prevent members from doing so (either perceptual or real) may lead to other ‘creative’ 
coping mechanisms that are employed primarily at the level of perception, or else the 
“internalization of inferiority.”71 The latter undoubtedly leads to lower levels of self-esteem and 
negative self-image.  
 
The only case mentioned in the authors’ study where the individual may identify with the 
threatened social category is when the moral values or ‘integrity’ of the group are questioned.72 
In this case, the group’s moral integrity is scrutinized due to its mistreatment or harming of 
another group, and the members with the lowest commitment are often found to suffer the most 
from affective emotions like guilt.73 In this context, there is a higher possibility that an individual 
may identify with the group and act on its behalf in attempts to restore its moral integrity as a 
result of the collective guilt that he/she feels. However, the authors assert that this will translate 
into “prosocial” (and not defensive/conflictual) behavior towards the mistreated group.74  
 
The second combination—group-directed threat vs. high individual commitment—supports the 
hypothesis that highly committed members of a group fall back further on the group when the 
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group faces a threat. This suggests that individuals with a more salient religious identity are 
likely to become even more religious in a crisis. Across the different levels (perceptual, affective, 
and behavior), group members strive to further distinguish their group from relevant out-groups. 
Efforts to do so include strengthening in-group stereotypes to promote further homogeneity 
among members—and thus strengthening the in-group.75 Feeling challenged or threatened, group 
members’ self-esteem is negatively affected as strong ties to the group prevent them from 
passing into another, more attractive, group that provides better chances for positive self-
evaluation. Findings here support that these perceptual and affective conditions are “conducive 
to collective group behavior” or collective action.76  
 
In SIT, the determinant of behavior in a condition of strong group identification is primarily the 
perception of the legitimacy and stability of the group status. As reported in the study cited here, 
the behavioral outcomes resulting from strong group distinction and tense relationships between 
in- and out-groups usually manifest themselves in competitive tendencies. For low status groups 
(as is the case of religious minorities in Europe for example), this is likely to take the form of 
collective action in an attempt to amend the group’s situation. With regards to threat to group 
moral values, similar patterns are displayed along all three levels. Members with high levels of 
commitment are more likely to react defensively, and less likely to consider the actual harm they 
may have inflicted upon other out-groups.  
 
The challenge of redressing the situation of a group as seen fit by more committed group 
members often takes place as a competition between the in- and out-group. The manner in which 
the competition will play out is ultimately the result of the normative environment of the group 
upon which behavior is dictated. Strategies that committed members adopt in attempting to 
redress the situation may exacerbate real and perceived tensions between the in- and out-group, 
sometimes further stigmatizing the group and confirming the beliefs and conditions that lead to 
threat perceptions in the first place. These very same strategies may also make it difficult for less 
committed members to “pass” into other out-groups that increasingly perceive homogeneity 
amongst group members as a result.  
 
Putting Theory into Practice 
The dynamics of social identities as discussed in the previous section hold several implications 
for mainstream assumptions and views that underpin identity discourse in terrorism studies and 
studies on radicalization. In the “French sociology” school, identity crises result from a handful 
of factors that challenge the individual’s ability to reconcile two main social identities: religious 
and national social identities.  
 
In the first view (View 1), identity crises result from Muslims feeling unaccepted in society due 
to their religious affiliation. Tensions arise from the lack of fit between differing religious roles 
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in society. For Muslims, religion is more visible in the public realm than that of the mainstream. 
Coupled with real and/or perceived discrimination, Muslims respond to the threat by 
strengthening their ties to the “Muslim” social category, and further segregating themselves from 
the mainstream.  
 
In the second view (View 2), there exists a tension between traditional Islam as practiced by the 
first generation (the parents), and individually formed religious identities of later generations. 
Coupled with discrimination that they experience—or perceive—in mainstream society due to 
belonging to a suspect social identity, Muslims find it difficult to fully identify as Europeans. 
One of the solutions is joining an extremist group if “the individual shows receptiveness to 
extremist ideas.”77  
 
In View 1, the underlying assumption is that high levels of commitment to the “Muslim” social 
category automatically exist, and will therefore override commitment to other social categories 
and groups. Assuming individuals are highly committed to religious social identities to begin 
with, when their religious social category is threatened, SIT posits that they are more likely to 
fall back even further on religion. Because commitment is measured by the density and 
significance of social ties attached to a social category membership, it is also logical to assume 
that the larger the number of Muslims in an individual’s network, the stronger the religious social 
identity will be. This may be the case in diaspora neighborhoods in Europe where the majority of 
residents are Muslim immigrants who immigrated to Europe from the same country and live in 
tight-knit communities that less frequently interact with mainstream society. In this context, 
children are raised in an environment that is composed of primarily similar “others”—in this case 
Muslims from their countries of descent—and build networks based on these relationships.  
 
Bolt find that “strong religious attachments among Muslim immigrants lead to an increased 
desire to self-segregate that is not found among other immigrants of the same socio-economic 
level.”78 Similarly, a case study on the Muslim diaspora in the UK finds support for the argument 
that residential segregation contributes to the radicalization process.79 Other factors, such as 
perceived societal rejection and actual discriminatory practices of landlords and real estate 
agents, are also found to play a role in encouraging residential segregation.80 
 
The emergence of these “ethnic enclaves” may thus result in higher levels of commitment to 
immigrants’ religious and/or ethnic social identities and increase the likelihood of strongly 
identifying with religion at the expense of nationality.81 It also creates further challenges of 
reconciling or balancing the two identities as, the higher the perceived level of threat to the 
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religious identity from society, the less individuals will be willing to participate in society and 
the more defensive they may become towards society as a whole. In this case, religion is the 
predominant framework through which individuals interpret experience, and is therefore the 
most salient. The ensuing behaviors are thus very much dependent on the content of the religious 
frameworks and the norms they prescribe.  
 
Whereas the above explanation may hold true in cases were an Islamic social identity category is 
presumably extremely pervasive, it is problematic for number of reasons. First, it assumes that 
the practice of Islam among members of the diaspora, and across Muslim diaspora originating 
from different countries, is uniform. Polls do show that Muslims in Europe will generally 
identify themselves first as Muslims and then as nationals of the countries in which they are born 
and raised.82 But such identification fails to account for variation in how the same Muslims 
define their religious categories, and the meanings and practices they attach to their religious 
identity claims (a shortcoming that View 2 addresses). More importantly, it also fails to account 
for Muslims that are better integrated—measured here by the plurality and meaningfulness of 
other group memberships in mainstream society.  
 
One of the main contentions in social identity theory (SIT) is that social identities may be driven 
by overarching systems of meaning—like religion—but are also subject to being renegotiated 
according to the social contexts in which they are employed. Membership in differing groups in 
society will typically lessen the level of commitment to one ascribed identity (such as religion) 
and instead rely more on other factors related to chosen identity claims; for example the utility of 
alternative groups and social identities in boosting individual self-esteem. Further, because 
identity formation is subjected to feedback from the network in which an individual interacts, the 
secular nature of societies that later generations of European Muslims are brought up in suggest 
that less emphasis will be placed on utilizing religious frames in the public realm. Thus, the more 
memberships immigrants and/or minorities hold in groups that extend beyond their religion and 
ethnicity, the less tempered religious and ethnic frameworks become in daily interactions.83 In 
this case, it is unlikely that the religious identity will be the most salient, or else salient in a 
manner that distinguishes the individual from the majority to a point of discomfort that triggers 
an identity crisis.   
 
View 2 more accurately addresses the issue of context-specific religious identity formation. In 
this view, the immediate frustration is not the result of a religious identity incompatible with 
societal values, but one that is incompatible with traditional religious values practiced in the 
home. This frustration is compounded and leads to an identity crisis when coupled with real 
and/or perceived discrimination outside the home. In View 2, two assumptions form the 
corollary argument. The first is that second and third-generation Muslims are unable to reconcile 
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contrasting religious identities—their families’ and their own. The second is that the societies in 
which these individuals live discriminate against them for belonging to a suspect social category; 
a situation which creates feelings of alienation from both home and society. 
 
If one accepts the view that most second- and third-generation immigrants, born and raised in 
European countries, reject traditional Islamic practices as a starting point, it is reasonable to 
assume that the religious identities they craft for themselves will be more a reflection of the 
social settings in which they find themselves immersed. According to SIT, the formation of 
social identities is the outcome of exposure to a variety of networks and groups—of which there 
are also religious ones—that constitute different identity claims from which individuals choose. 
 
Sirseloudi’s study on second and third generation German Muslims of Turkish decent lends 
support to some of these findings. It shows how religious identity grows more out of individual 
choice, and how younger generations more consciously select elements from varying identity 
claims to shape their identities.84 The second generation is no longer engaged in a “defensive 
practice of religion” and appears more confident in building its own religious identity.85 The 
difference between the later generations and the first generation is that the former are entirely 
disconnected from the cultures of their home countries, and have not had traditional folk Islam 
imposed on them as their parents have. Thus, later generations learn and craft their religious 
identities in cultures that are mostly secular and adapt them accordingly.  
 
From this perspective, it can be argued that the better integrated an immigrant is—measured here 
by the plurality and meaningfulness of other group memberships in mainstream society—the less 
conservative and pervasive the religious identity will be as it will be balanced by various 
counter-social identities. Further, possessing this repertoire of identities suggests that individuals 
can switch between social identities depending on their relevance to a given context. When one 
social identity is unable to foster a positive sense of self or else provide meaning in a given 
context, individuals can resort to alternative social identities that are more suitable. This is 
supported by a study on Muslims in Switzerland, where the author finds that Muslim immigrants 
brought up in Switzerland typically have two large-scale dual identities that straddle the secular 
and religious spheres.86 The author similarly finds that youth are normally more likely to 
emphasize their religious social identity at home, and deemphasize it at school where the 
environment is less suitable to interact on a religious basis.87  
 
Although the study does not directly address the issue of tension that may arise among first and 
later generations with regards to religion, it supports the notion that Muslims are normally able to 
balance different social identities—particularly when actively participating in mainstream 
society. Such findings thus call into question the health of perspectives on religious identities and 
their role in radicalization processes.   
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Discrimination—real or perceived—can become a source of frustration for Muslim youth who 
are rejected for belonging to a social category that they may not fully identity with. It is a 
common factor in both views, and may trigger identity crises when combined with other factors 
such as personal crises or religious identity dynamics.  
 
In the case where commitment to religious identities is weak, European Muslims lack the 
opportunity to join groups in the mainstream, yet have few or no strong alternative social 
identities to resort to. The commitment-threat level taxonomy suggests that the inability to “pass” 
into other groups and the lack of alternatives may lead to the development of perceptual 
alternatives to cope or else the “internalization of inferiority.”88 In the case where commitment to 
religious identities is strong, immigrants will fall back further onto religion and become further 
alienated from mainstream society—as has been discussed elsewhere here. In both cases, 
discrimination may trigger an identity search that leaves the individual cognitively vulnerable 
and receptive to extremist ideologies as a source of identity. Essentially, it is alternatives existing 
outside the mainstream and the familial realms that seem to be the most attractive to the 
individual that is unable to identify with either. The outcome ultimately depends on which 
alternative will reach the individual first.  
 
The second assumption in View 2 may be valid when explaining attitudes and behaviors amongst 
individuals whose commitment to religion is high. Indeed, there is a general consensus on the 
finding that the more devout Muslim immigrants are, the less likely they are to join other groups 
or identify with other social categories.89  However, it does not account for Muslims who already 
hold group memberships in society and are better integrated.  
 
It is unrealistic to expect that European Muslims, who have forged meaningful relationships in 
groups and networks in mainstream society, are then targeted by the same groups and 
networks.90 Even if the individual does come under scrutiny by some group members due to 
his/her affiliation to a stigmatized or ‘suspect’ social category—Islam for example—the effects 
of threat on members who hold lower levels of commitment to groups (as suggested in the 
taxonomy) indicate that the perceptual, affective, and behavioral response of the individual will 
be to distance him/herself from the threatened category.91 Behavioral outcomes are expected to 
place more emphasis on alternative social identities—“passing” into other groups—or else 
shifting the blame on other group members of the social category to demonstrate heterogeneity 
among group members.92 Further, because identity formation is subjected to feedback from the 
network in which an individual interacts, the secular nature of societies European Muslims are 
brought up in implies that less emphasis is placed on utilizing religious frames in the public 
realm.93  
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Applying SIT to the “French Sociology” school highlights a number of flaws in the logic and 
assumptions supporting the primary views within it. Despite this, the views themselves can 
nevertheless be substantiated when complemented by further levels of analysis. In other words, 
there are explanations that could account for why and how, contrary to SIT dictates on social 
identity dynamics and consequent behavior, the challenged assumptions on individual 
radicalization in both views may nevertheless be true. In this context, the “Social Movement and 
Network Theory” school, together with this paper’s findings from SIT, may be helpful in 
providing some of the answers. Of special interest in this paper is the influence of Islamic 
“meso-level” organizations, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and social 
movement organizations (SMOs) on religious identity formation of diaspora members.94  
 
The formation and transformation of religious identities of later generations in the diaspora may 
be more individualized than that of the first generation, yet the process is nevertheless subject to 
external influences. Later generations refusing to fully conform to the traditional practice of 
religion are nevertheless bound to come into contact with religious groups and individuals that 
try and influence their religious identity formation processes.  
 
In Europe, these voices range from NGOs like Millî Görüş in Germany or the Muslim Council of 
Britain (MCB) in the UK, that claim to represent Muslims in the diaspora yet are more often than 
not Islamist in nature, to more extreme organizations like al-Muhajiroun or Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). 
Religiously inspired groups need not be organized and can also operate through informal 
channels like mosques and student unions on university campuses.95   
 
Another band of organizations and programs that have formed as a response to the challenge of 
radicalization are ones premised on the promotion of pluralistic and democratic religious 
definitions. Establishments like the Quillham foundation in the UK that has recently begun 
working with the government to implement counter-radicalization programs is but one example. 
Unfortunately, these organizations continue to receive less attention than the more common 
Islamist NGOs as credible Islamic voices.96 
 
The availability of Islamist NGOs in the Muslim diaspora environment has important 
implications for the identity formation and transformation processes. This is because they are not 
only there to serve the social needs of Muslims, but also work to institute themselves as the 
official representatives of religion in the country. In many cases, these organizations will act as 
official conduits between Muslims in the diaspora and European governments, and this implies 
that it is primarily their frameworks of meaning through which each sees and understands the 
other. The extent of influence of these organizations can be measured by their success in 
establishing and maintaining social services (such as mosques, schools and ‘cultural’ events) that 
focus primarily on Muslim youth.97 An in-depth background study of the major NGOs is beyond 
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the scope of this paper, but several studies have been carried out that cover their expansion into 
Europe and the West.98 
 
The most important effect of the growth of Islamist NGOs as representatives of religion is that, 
through their activism and social services, it is primarily their interpretation of religion that 
permeates the conscience of Muslim second- and third- generation immigrants. Because rejection 
of modernity as dictated by secular values lies at the heart of all Islamist ideologies, the adoption 
of Islam as preached by these organizations is the first step in the imposition of a cognitive 
barrier to social integration among Muslim youth. Islamist NGOs provide the material support to 
members of the diaspora whilst actively seeking to impose stricter Islamic norms through social 
channels. Their presence outside the diaspora and as official spokespersons for diaspora 
members means that elements of their ideology will infiltrate the religious identity formation 
process of Muslim youth as well as possibly transform identities of better-integrated Muslims. 
 
It is surprising that few studies have been carried out on the effect of Islamist organizations and 
religious identity formation. This paper contends that the more power an Islamist NGO/SMO has 
in the diaspora - through its control of social services and its sway on local governments - the 
more challenging Muslim youth will find it to integrate. As these organizations grow in size, and 
begin to extend beyond the diaspora, their ideologies are bound to have an effect on even better 
integrated individuals.  
 
From a social identity perspective the argument can be structured as follows: The one thing in 
common amongst all Islamist ideologies is their view that Western, secular values are antithetical 
to those of Islam and that they corrupt Muslims. The decline in the morals and thus the lower 
“status” of Muslims on the world stage is the result of Muslims straying from the true Islamic 
path. The solution is to be found, in varying degrees, in a purification of religious practice 
through stricter adherence to the basic tenets of religion through the full application of God’s law 
or Shari’a. The problem these organizations pose to the religious social identity of Muslim youth 
at once becomes obvious.  
 
The frameworks of meaning set down by Islamist organizations are ones that not only demarcate 
themselves according to religious criteria, but also actively attribute negative characteristics to 
all other out-groups. All groups are marked in contradistinction to others, yet Islamist groups 
uphold norms and values that go one step further and demonize others. Schwartz contends that 
“terrorism requires having divided people into two categories,” where the “dichotomization […] 
extends beyond mere descriptive differentiation to include an intense evaluative component.”99 
This dichotomization is not only a characteristic of the religiously inspired terrorist group but is 
similarly one that exists within the frameworks of meaning that Islamist organizations employ. 
The more accentuated the in-group positive/out-group negative stereotypes are, the more 
demonized the out-group becomes and the less tolerant members become of other views.  
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Erikson terms this dichotomization “pseudospeciation,” and this process takes place at both the 
community level where Islamists are heavily entrenched, as well as in terrorist organizations.100 
As they also claim to be bearers of religious truths, they pose massive challenges to Muslim 
youth who are eager to wax and wane their definitions of religion so as to better integrate into 
society, yet are unsure as to whether doing so is religiously legit. These organizations bring 
religion to the fore in environments were religion to its adherents is individualized, cherry-
picked, and does not reign supreme. In effect, the inability to reconcile identities is not an 
inherent characteristic of the European Muslim, but one that is gradually built in to him/her as 
exposure to abovementioned Islamist groups grows.   
 
Given the collectivist characteristics of many diaspora communities, the more influential these 
organizations become in society as the official representatives of Islam, the more Muslim youth 
will be pressured to succumb to their frameworks of meaning. As the basic tenets of Islamist 
ideology are inherently hostile to the surrounding society, individuals adopting their frames of 
reference not only withdraw from society, but are also likely to develop hostile attitudes towards 
other out-groups. On the one hand, immigrants gradually lose other group memberships because 
the religious cognitive frameworks they employ no longer allow for positive self-evaluations 
belonging to them. On the other, the individual finds him/herself strongly committed to a social 
identity whose group prototypes—the Islamists—constantly propagate a narrative of victim-hood 
and discrimination.  
 
For better-integrated immigrants, exposure to Islamist ideologies through their control of 
religious social or else non-related Islamist forms of activism on university campuses is bound to 
be a source of confusion. At the very least, these organizations work to instill doubts in these 
individuals’ minds as to the soundness in engaging with the mainstream. Here, a variety of tools 
may be used to do so. Depending on the context, these could range from emphasizing the 
negative out-group stereotypes as set down by the ideology’s cognitive framework, or else 
summoning negative feelings by warning well-integrated youth of the religious consequences of 
partaking in certain activities.  
 
In both cases, the portrayal of the West as engaging in a conspiracy to defeat Islam as portrayed 
by the media and other propaganda buttresses the narratives of organizations in their attempts to 
demonize surrounding societies. This process of instilling better-integrated Muslims with 
confusion and doubt is the first step in tampering with the natural functions of social identities in 
providing self-assuredness, confidence, and positive feedback. It helps explain why even better-
integrated Muslims may be prone to identity crises: continued exposure to conflicting feelings 
may lead to an identity search which leaves the individual prone to influence and indoctrination.   
 
Islamist organizations not only demonize the other but also argue that a return to a more purified 
version of Islam is the answer to the woes of Muslims worldwide. These organizations may not 
call for violent means to change the status quo, but nevertheless agitate for a change in the status 
quo. European Muslims adopting the Islamist religious identity are not only restrained by it in 
terms of passing into other groups or taking on other group memberships, but are also taught to 
believe that the status of Islam and Muslims is not legitimate.  
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The desired outcome of all Islamist groups (even the violent ones) is the eventual 
implementation of Shari’a at the state level, and the widespread practice of Islam throughout the 
world, for example, elevations of Islam’s status as a social category within society. These two 
conditions—inability to pass into other social members and the perception of an illegitimate 
groups status—are found in SIT to be conducive to conflict-prone behavior. What’s more, the 
manner in which the status of Islam is supposed to be elevated according to Islamism is through 
the adherence of its followers to a strict moral code that attempts to apply religion in every 
aspect of life. Once Muslims have returned to the true religious path, God will respond in kind 
and elevate their status in the world. In the diaspora, this inevitably leads to frustration as this 
worldview does nothing more than further segregate Muslims, heighten their sense of seclusion 
and disenfranchisement, and limit their opportunities in other fields or jobs.  
 
The worldview this identity encompasses also turns perceived discrimination into real hostility 
between in and out group members, as escalating identification with the religious identity 
translates into higher levels of outward hostility. The final step to adopting violence may result 
from the inability of the religious identity to immediately fulfill its promise—status elevation—
and thus encourages some to adopt violence as a means to effect change faster. The final step of 
dehumanizing the out-group to legitimize the use of violence against them is made easier by 
religious understandings that view them as immoral aggressors; the strategies for which 
constitute the cornerstone of Jihadist propaganda and indoctrination processes. Further studies 
are needed to explain the connection between demonizing and dehumanizing as this is arguably 
the main difference in outlook between extremists and violent extremists.  
 
Conclusion 
Studies on homegrown radicalization show that identity is an important element in the process. 
The main views on identity in the literature suggest that one of the main causes of radicalization 
is an identity crisis that is triggered by a handful of exogenous factors, of which a perceived 
threat to religious identity is key.  
 
Building on a summary of the main schools of thought on identity and radicalization as per 
terrorism studies literature, social identity theory (SIT) was used in the paper to both expand on 
and challenge some of the underlying assumptions and findings on the topic. Findings from SIT 
suggest that identities are not only driven by social categories (i.e. religion or nationality), but are 
also negotiated and redefined on the community level. On the one hand, identities are formed in 
response to contextual and social stimuli and cues. On the other, the cognitive frameworks that 
define the various groups and networks in which the individual interacts have a significant 
impact on what s/he perceives, as well as consequent behavior. Of utmost importance to human 
beings is that the groups they belong to furnish them with a positive sense of self. Furthermore, 
the availability of groups perceived to possess a “higher status” in society (for example those 
related more to majority categories in society) typically encourage efforts by members from 
lower status groups (i.e. minority group members) to pass into them.  
 
Findings from SIT lend support to some of the views in identity discourse in studies on 
radicalization, however they also outline a number of flawed assumptions that require further 
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research. Amongst these is the prevailing assumption that religious identities for European 
Muslims are ipso facto the most salient, and will inevitably lead to defensive behavior that is 
more easily manipulated by extremists when threatened. An overview of the literature on 
European Muslims, as well as threat and social identities, lends little support to this assumption. 
Similarly, the view that identity crises are a result of tension between two weak identities fails to 
account for how European Muslims manage their multiple identities, for example, their religious 
and national identities.  
 
Studies on radicalization have typically focused on extremists and/or illegal radical organizations 
that promote extremist views without taking into consideration the much larger spectrum of legal 
Islamist organizations that share similar worldviews. The assumption is that, because they 
condemn violence, such organizations should not be discounted as legitimate Islamic fronts, and 
can perhaps assist in countering violent Islamic extremism. This paper has attempted to begin 
exploring some of the subtler, non-violent ways those Islamist organizations and NGOs may 
actually be contributing to the normative environment that allows radical ideas and behaviors to 
flourish. Although not empirically tested, SIT highlights a handful of identity processes that can 
aid in understanding the various ways that identities can be radicalized. Crucial to this theory is 
the human, and more importantly, group/community level factor and how it contributes to the 
identity formation/transformation process. 
 
There are a number of actors that exert influence on European Muslims, and this paper has 
offered a humble exploration of the effect of European Islamism, as enshrined in legal “Islamic” 
institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), on Muslim identity. The preliminary 
conclusions find that the formal recognition of many of these NGOs by the state not only grants 
credibility to, but also further entrenches Islamist ideology into the consciousness of European 
Muslims.  
 
These NGOs institutionalize and champion a collective “Islamic” social identity that suppresses 
individual identity formation and expression, instead promoting a collective identity grounded in 
extremist narratives/rhetoric. This social identity is not solely premised on religion, but is shaped 
in a manner that reflects the rejectionist nature of Islamist ideology and promotes the salience of 
exclusionist religious identity attributes to the detriment of other identity attributes.101 The more 
pervasive these cognitive frameworks become as a frame of reference for Muslims, the less able 
they are to pass into or else retain other group memberships and social identities. Thus the 
normal coping mechanisms that Muslim members of European societies may resort to if faced 
with discrimination, or else the feeling of belonging to a stigmatized social category, are 
intentionally diminished by the existence of such organizations and social movements that 
religiously de-sanctify interacting with the ‘other.’  
 
From this perspective, radicalization can be understood as a process of first fostering an increase 
in religious awareness and then manipulating this awareness for political ends. Coupled with a 
steady demonization of other social identities (for example, ‘Britishness’), Muslims are steadily 
radicalized as religious frameworks—perceived and real—belonging to their Islamic social 
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identity become dominant frames of reference in daily interactions. These frameworks result in 
further seclusion, a heightened perception of discrimination and injustice. The adoption of 
violence/becoming a violent Islamic extremist is understood as lying at the very end of the 
suggested trajectory.  
 
The active search for extremist ideologies as alternatives is not an immediate outcome of identity 
crises. Rather, there exist within societies external sources of influence that may contribute to 
making immigrants more prone to adopting extremist means and methods. As Moghaddam 
suggests in his “Staircase to Terrorism” model of radicalization, “It is conditions on the ground 
floor that lead to terrorism […] Only by reforming conditions on the ground floor can societies 
end terrorism.”102 In Moghaddam’s “ground floor,” it is the perceptions of individuals, and what 
shapes them, that provide the foundation for violent radicalization. Further research on the 
influence of community-level networks and groups in shaping identity and its constituent 
cognitive elements thus holds much promise for adding to the discourse on radicalization.  
 
                                                 
102
 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism,” American Psychologist 60:2 (2005): 166-67. 
Al Raffie: Social Identity Theory Islamic Extremism
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
